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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DAVID LEE BARRETT, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 890435-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1989). A plea of no contest 
was entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for 
Juab County, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, presiding. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether exigent 
circumstance and probable cause were present to justify a 
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
The right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, David Lee Barrett, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence seized in a warrantless search of 
defendant's vehicle (R. 18). Upon the trial court's denial of 
the motion, defendant entered a no contest plea pursuant to State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), specifically 
reserving his right to withdraw that plea should this Court rule 
in his favor on appeal (R. 40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 28, 1988 at approximately 1:30 p.m., Trooper 
Paul Mangelson, a 22 year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol, was 
on duty on the northbound lanes of 1-15 between the two Nephi, 
Utah, exits (T. 4). He had just finished issuing a citation when 
two vehicles, which appeared to him to be traveling together at 
the same speed, passed him. Mangelson thought the cars were 
exceeding the speed limit and clocked them at the speed of 75 
miles per hour. After some difficulty, he pulled both vehicles 
over (T. 5). Trooper Mangelson parked between the two cars, went 
to the rear vehicle, driven by defendant, and told defendant that 
he would be right back after taking care of the front vehicle. 
Trooper Mangelson discovered a large duffel bag of marijuana in 
the trunk of the first vehicle (T. 6, 7). He returned to 
defendant's vehicle and asked him for his driver's license and 
whether defendant was traveling with the first vehicle. 
Defendant replied that he was not. Trooper Mangelson, who 
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estimated that the front vehicle was over one hundred feet ahead 
of defendant's vehicle, smelled marijuana at defendant's vehicle 
(T. 7, 37). Defendant refused to consent to a search of his 
vehicle, and Trooper Mangelson, based on the strong smell of raw 
marijuana and his prior experience, searched defendant's vehicle 
and found approximately 35 pounds of marijuana in the trunk (T. 
7, 8). The marijuana was packed in a large blue duffel bag 
identical to the bag found in the front car (T. 8, 9). Defendant 
was arrested for possession of marijuana and issued a citation 
for traveling at 75 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone (T. 12, 13). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence seized by Trooper Mangelson, Trooper Mangelson testified 
to the reasons he searched defendant's vehicle. He stated that 
the strong smell of raw marijuana, the absence of luggage in the 
passenger compartment of defendant's vehicle and the fact that 
the two vehicles he stopped appeared to be traveling together, a 
drug courier scenario that he had seen on one prior occasion, led 
him to believe that defendant was transporting marijuana (T. 8, 
10, 11). Trooper Mangelson also testified that defendant was 
extremely nervous and tried to prevent Trooper Mangelson from 
opening the vehicle's trunk (T. 14-16). The marijuana seized 
from defendant was in individually wrapped packages, and Trooper 
Mangelson found no evidence of the use of any substance in the 
packaging to conceal its odor (T. 28, 39). In addition, Trooper 
At page six of his appellate brief, defendant states that the 
small bags of marijuana in his vehicle were insulated from each 
other by the use of baking soda, an odor suppressing agent. He 
further states that the small bags were packed in several larger 
garbage bags and that those were insulated from one another with 
Mangelson testified that he did not open the garbage bag 
(presumably found inside the duffel bag) containing marijuana 
from the front vehicle prior to his search of defendant's vehicle 
(T. 38).2 
At the suppression hearing the trial court found that 
Trooper Mangelson had observed two cars that he believed were 
traveling together and exceeding the speed limit and that he made 
a valid highway stop (T. 80-81). It also found that Trooper 
Mangelson had smelled marijuana in defendant's vehicle and that, 
based on his long experience of smelling marijuana and his 
numerous arrests in the area, he had a superior ability to detect 
the odor of marijuana (T. 81-83). The Court concluded that 
exigent circumstances and probable cause were present and were 
sufficient to justify a warrantless search of defendant's vehicle 
(T. 83). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress because the warrantless search of defendant's automobile 
and the subsequent seizure of marijuana was legally justified. 
Cont. baking soda. Defendant cites both Trooper Mangelson's 
and defendant's testimonies in support of the statements. 
However, Trooper Mangelson specifically stated that he found no 
evidence of an odor suppressing agent (T. 39). Defendant stated 
only that he saw baking soda spilled when the marijuana was 
unpacked (T. 50). No testimony was presented specifying, as 
defendant states, the layer by layer packaging with baking soda. 
2 
Defendant, at page 5 of his appellate brief, states twice that 
Trooper Mangelson unpacked the marijuana in the front vehicle 
before searching defendant's vehicle. Those assertions are not 
supported by the record. At no time did Trooper Mangelson 
testify that he unpacked the marijuana from the first vehicle; in 
fact, he stated that the garbage bag in which it was packed had 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AFTER 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE; THE SEIZURE OF MARIJUANA WAS 
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED FOR 
THE SEARCH AND THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO 
THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIRMENT APPLIES IN THIS 
CASE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress because Trooper Mangelson did not have 
probable cause to search defendant's vehicle and exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless search were not present. 
In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court applies the 
following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action 
in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. . 
. . The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
'correction of error' standard. . . . 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(citations omitted). But see State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 122 
(Utah 1983); State v. Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987) (which suggest 
that the "clearly erroneous" standard applies to the trial 
court's factual evaluation and its legal conclusion). In the 
instant case defendant disputes both the facts attendant to the 
search of his vehicle and the court's legal conclusion that the 
search was constitutional. 
In contesting the trial court's factual findings, 
defendant asserts that Trooper Mangelson could not have smelled 
the raw marijuana in defendant's vehicle. In the alternative, 
defendant argues that even if Trooper Mangelson had smelled 
marijuana, it must have come from the front vehicle, parked a 
short distance up the road where already he had found marijuana. 
(Br. of App. at 18). Defendant states that Trooper Mangelson had 
unpacked the 60 pounds of marijuana from the front vehicle and 
still had the smell of marijuana on his hands. Defendant states 
further that the marijuana in defendant's vehicle was packaged in 
approximately 30 zip-lock plastic bags, surrounded by 6 to 10 
garbage bags insulated with odor suppressing agents. The record 
does not support such factual conclusions. Trooper Mangelson 
testified that he dectected the strong smell of marijuana at 
defendant's vehicle (T. 78). He stated that he did not unpack 
the marijuana from the front vehicle, and no testimony exists 
stating that he did unpack the marijuana (T. 38). He also stated 
that he found no evidence of any odor suppressing agent in the 
packaging of the marijuana in defendant's vehicle (T. 39). 
Defendant did testify to the presence of baking soda when 
defendant unpacked the marijuana at a later time (T. 50). 
However, he did not offer any evidence attesting to the efficacy 
of baking soda as an odor suppressing agent. It is the trial 
court's function, when acting as the trier of fact, to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327; State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987). In light of the evidence 
received, the trial court's finding that Trooper Mangelson did 
smell raw marijuana at defendant's vehicle was not clearly 
erroneous. 
Defendant argues that Trooper Mangelson lacked probable 
cause to search defendant's vehicle. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "warrantless vehicle searches are not invalid under 
the Fourth Amendment if probable cause for a search exists." 
State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1986) (citations 
omitted). Applying the United States Supreme Court definition of 
probable cause for a vehicle search, the Cour-c in Dorsey stated 
that probable cause was 
a belief, reasonably arising out of the 
circumstances known to the seizing officer, 
that an automobile or other vehicle contains 
that which by law is subject to seizure . . . 
Probable cause exists where 'the facts and 
circumstances within their [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that' an offense has 
been or is being committed. 
Id. at 1088 (citing United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 
162 (1925), and Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 
(1949)). 
The validity of the probable cause 
determination is made from the objective 
standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer . . . guided by his 
experience and training.' 
Id. (citations omitted). 
This Court, in State v. Bartley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 
(Utah Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1989), has applied the "plain view" 
doctrine, as it encompasses "plain smell," to determine whether 
probable cause existed for a warrantless vehicle search. Bartley 
was a case involving the seizure of "drip gas" resulting from the 
sheriff's smelling the readily apparent, unique odor of "drip 
gas." There, this Court applied the three-prong test of whether: 
(1) the officer was lawfully present; (2) the object could be 
plainly smelled; and (3) the odor was clearly incriminating. Id. 
at 42 (noting that there was no "reasonable expectation of 
privacy from the 'inquisitive nostrils' of lawfully present 
officers and citing United States v. Johnston, 497 F.2d 397, 398 
(9th Cir. 1974)). "Clearly incriminating" was defined as having 
"probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity." j[d. (citations omitted). 
Defendant argues that there are no plain smell cases 
similar to the instant case, where the smell of raw, rather than 
burned, marijuana constituted probable cause for a warrantless 
search and seizure. However, numerous federal cases uphold the 
seizure of marijuana based on the officer's smelling of the odor 
of its raw form. In United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494 
F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1974), the warrantless vehicle search and 
seizure of bulk raw marijuana from a car's trunk were upheld 
where officers, sniffing around the crevice where the trunk 
closes, detected the odor of marijuana. See also United States 
v. Ogden, 572 F.2d 501, 502 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 439 U.S. 979 
(1978) ("The agents' identification of the odor of marijuana is 
enough to support probable cause to search. . . . No warrant is 
required for the search of an automobile under such 
circumstances."); United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1099 
(5th Cir. 1979) ("It is well settled that detection of the odor 
of marijuana furnishes probable cause to search a vehicle,"). 
In light of the federal cases just cited, the smell of 
raw marijuana could supply sufficient probable cause for a 
search. Application of the "plain smell" standard to the facts 
of the instant case manifestly demonstrates that the search was 
justified. First, Trooper Mangelson was lawfully present at 
defendant's vehicle, having validly stopped defendant for 
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exceeding the speed limit. Second, Trooper Mangelson, who had 
had many years of experience, had made "thousands" of drug 
related arrests and had specific drug enforcement training, 
testified to the "plain smell" of raw marijuana, which was 
readily apparent to him. Third, the odor of marijuana is per se 
"clearly incriminating" because its possession in any quantity 
without a prescription is unlawful. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) 
(Supp. 1989). Moreover, Trooper Mangelson testified to other 
factors he considered prior to initiating his warrantless search 
of defendant's vehicle. The fact that defendant's vehicle and 
the vehicle in front of his seemed to be traveling in tandem, a 
drug courier practice familiar to Trooper Mangelson, the absence 
of luggage in the passenger compartment and defendant's extreme 
nervousness all contributed to his probable cause determination. 
In that determination Trooper Mangelson acted in a prudent, 
reasonable and cautious manner guided by his experience and 
training. 
Although defendant asserted below that the highway stop of his 
vehicle was pretextual, no such argument is presented on appeal. 
Defendant also argues that no exigent circumstances 
were present in the instant case to justify a warrantless search 
of defendant's vehicle. He states that, in an automobile search, 
"the presence of exigent circumstances cannot be assumed but must 
be compelling before a warrantless search is justified." (Br. of 
App. at 11). Defendant fails to cite any legal authority for 
this "compelling exigent circumstance" standard, and the State 
can find no evidence of the existence of such a standard. 
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution subject to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The United 
States Supreme Court first developed the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment in Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In that case the Court 
stated that, if reasonable and probable cause existed for 
believing that a vehicle contained contraband, an officer could 
search the vehicle for that contraband without a warrant. Id., at 
153, 156. The Court initially based its ruling on the ready 
mobility of a vehicle but over the years expanded the bases for 
the exception. The Court, in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 
(1985), stated that one's expectation of privacy with respect to 
one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to 
one's home or office and that the reduced expectation derived 
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles traveling on public 
highways. Jd. at 390-392 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 367 (1976), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-
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41 (1973)). The Court has consistently held that a search 
warrant is not necessary where there is probable cause to search 
an automobile stopped on the highway because the car is movable, 
the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be 
found again if a warrant must be obtained. Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have 
recognized and applied the Carroll-Chambers doctrine. See State 
v. Shields, 28 Utah 405, 406, 503 P.2d 848, 849 (1972); State v. 
Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978); State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 
1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In the instant case, the 
circumstances of the warrantless search fall squarely within the 
automobile exception. The vehicle was lawfully stopped on a 
highway, 1-15, and remained mobile. Defendant was alerted to 
Trooper Mangelson's intent to search for marijuana. Defendant 
could have disposed of the duffel bag filled with marijuana 
within moments had he not been detained and his vehicle searched. 
Defendant argues that it would not have been 
"impractical" for Trooper Mangelson to obtain a search warrant by 
radio or telephone. The standard for conducting a warrantless 
vehicle search is not "practicality" but the well-established 
"automobile exception" standard discussed supra. In support of 
his argument in favor of procurement of a telephone warrant, 
defendant cites State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). In 
that case the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless 
search of a residence. While the search of an immobile house 
with high expectations of privacy in Ashe is factually 
distinguishable from the vehicle search in the instant case, even 
there the Court specifically declined to rule on whether the 
State had a burden of proving unavailability of a telephone 
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warrant. Id. at 1267. Its statement of encouragement to law 
enforcement agents to seek warrants whenever possible, as cited 
by defendant, cannot be viewed as a mandate to use telephone 
warrants, and since Ashe the Court has not spoken further on that 
issue. Id. at 1267 n. 59. 
In conjunction with his arguments concerning telephone 
warrant requirements, defendant urges the application of 
independent state grounds covering the conducting of a 
warrantless search. However, defendant failed to raise or 
analyze that issue at the trial level, and that failure precludes 
this Court from considering it on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Defendant further argues that because the VIN of the 
car itself did not match the VIN on its registration, Trooper 
Mangelson should have seized and impounded the car prior to his 
search. However, defendant did not make this argument at the 
trial court. Therefore, an appellate court will not consider it 
on appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) 
Defendant's cite to Justice Durham's dissent in Ashe is 
inaccurate (Br. of App. at 19). There, Justice Durham urges the 
establishment of a State burden to show unavailability of a 
telephone warrant. However, Justice Durham's dissent is not the 
majority opinion at the present time and cannot be relied upon as 
being dispositive of the issue. Moreover, the majority's 
specific refusal to rule on that issue cannot be viewed as an 
endorsement of Justice Durham's position. 
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("where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for 
suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an 
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal")• 
Finally, defendant cites Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443 (1971), and State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), 
as "indistinguishable" from the instant case for fourth amendment 
purposes. The contrary is true. In Coolidge, a vehicle was 
searched pursuant to a substantively deficient warrant (the 
warrant had been issued by the Attorney General in charge of the 
investigation acting as a Justice of the Peace) two days after it 
had been towed to the police station and impounded. None of the 
Carroll-Chambers exigencies were present in that case, and the 
Supreme Court appropriately found the automobile exception to be 
irrelevant. In State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the impoundment and warrantless search 
of a vehicle that police had good reason to believe was used in 
the commission of a crime even though it was parked in front of a 
residence at the time of the search and its occupants had already 
been arrested. Defendant apparently relies on Justice Wilkins's 
dissent in Griffin to support his position, but a dissent, 
however persuasive it may be to defendant, is not binding on this 
Court. Moreover, the facts in Griffin as in Coolidge are 
substantively different from those in the instant case, in which 
all the factors incident to application of the automobile 
exception are present. Relying on its factual findings and 
applying the applicable legal standards, the trial court properly 
concluded that both probable cause and exigent circumstances 
existed for the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this ?4 day of January, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
QuMfAJiflQfc&iJ 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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